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Abstract: We show that leapfrogging and growth reversals entail sizeable welfare gains and losses,
respectively, in an AK economy that cannot credibly commit to investment when borrowing from in-
ternational financial markets. Small no-commitment delays originate a trade-oﬀ that has an ambiguous
eﬀect on welfare: they reduce the long-run consumption growth rate but increase the initial level of con-
sumption that is optimally chosen. Essentially, the larger the delay, the tighter the borrowing constraint
and the weaker the incentives to accumulate capital, so that smaller growth and larger initial consump-
tion follow. We show under logarithmic utility and small delays that the short-run eﬀect dominates the
long-run eﬀect and that welfare improves, provided that the economy has historically been growing fast
enough, and numerical examples suggest that this benchmark result extends to CRRA utility. When
relative risk aversion is larger than one, it follows that there exists a positive welfare-maximizing delay
associated with slower growth relative to the no-delay case. We then apply our results to show that
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2leapfrogging in consumption level typically imply large welfare gains. In contrast, growth reversals oc-
cur for large delays and lead to significant welfare losses. Finally, financial integration, as measured by
the credit multiplier given the no-commitment delay, is welfare-improving only for economies that have
historically been growing fast enough.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we show that leapfrogging and growth reversals entail sizeable welfare
gains and losses, respectively, in an AK economy that cannot credibly commit to invest-
ment when borrowing from international financial markets. We extend the analysis of
Boucekkine and Pintus [5] by considering optimal growth and we show that small no-
commitment delays originate a trade-oﬀ that has an ambiguous eﬀect on welfare: they
reduce the long-run consumption growth rate but increase the initial level of consump-
tion that is optimally chosen. Essentially, the larger the delay, the tighter the borrowing
constraint and the weaker the incentives to accumulate capital, which in turn imply
smaller growth but larger initial consumption. The (long-run) growth eﬀect reduces
welfare whereas the (short-run) level eﬀect improves it when the no-commitment delay
increases from zero.
We show under logarithmic utility that small delays improve welfare (i.e., the short-
run eﬀect dominates the long-run eﬀect) provided that the economy has historically
been growing fast enough, and numerical examples suggest that this benchmark result
extends to CRRA utility. When relative risk aversion is larger than one, numerical ex-
amples show that there exists a positive welfare-maximizing delay that is associated with
slower growth relative to the no-delay case.
3We next apply our results in two directions. First, we show that leapfrogging occurs,
in the sense that economies that have historically been poorer but growing faster end
up enjoying a larger long-run consumption level. We show that leapfrogging typically
entail welfare gains due to significant consumption gains. In particular, the gains from
leapfrogging are substantially larger for economies that have been either declining or
growing slowly in the past. Second we show that, for large delays, the economy experi-
ences sudden breaks such that the growth rate goes either from below to above trend or
from above to below trend. These growth reversals lead to sizeable welfare losses that
arise because the negative growth eﬀect dominates the positive level eﬀect on consump-
tion. Finally, we also derive results showing how financial integration, as measured by
the credit multiplier, aﬀects welfare in a non-trivial way under small no-commitment
delays: it is welfare-improving only for economies that have historically been growing
fast enough.
Although there is documented evidence that growth reversals are ubiquitous (Haus-
mann, Pritchett and Rodrik [12], Jones and Olken [13], Cuberes and Jerzmanowski [8]),
there is to our knowledge no assessment of whether such episodes are associated with
significant welfare changes. Our paper aims at providing a first step in this direction. A
related paper by Gourinchas and Jeanne [11] shows that welfare gains from convergence
are small but the model the author use as a measurement device assumes exogenous
growth and, therefore, cannot account from leapfrogging and growth reversals. Our
paper is also connected to the large and growing literature showing that credit and col-
lateral constraints may trigger macroeconomic volatility and sudden stops (see, among
many others, Paasche [18], Aghion et al. [1], Mendoza [17], Devereux and Yetman [9]).
In contrast with our study, however, this research body abstracts away from welfare
analysis. Therefore, an open question is whether or not those models give rise to busi-
ness cycles that are costly in terms of welfare, in view of the fact that they rely on the
4assumption that growth is exogenous (Barlevy [3]). Diﬀerent from this literature, our
paper shows that large welfare gains and losses originate from leapfrogging and growth
reversals, respectively, under small no-commitment delays. In particular, growth rever-
sals are particularly costly in terms of consumption utility, relative both to autarky and
to the no-delay case configuration.
Our analysis underlines that some parameter constellations do accord with the em-
pirical evidence emphasizing that finance promotes growth (King and Levine [14, 15],
Rajan and Zingales [19]) and that strong growth fueled by international borrowing may
occasionally lead to sudden downturns (Rancie`re, Tornell and Westermann [20]). Re-
lated to this strand of literature also is one corollary of our results pointing at the fact
that the debt-to-GDP ratio may be a poor indicator of how financial integration aﬀects
growth and welfare. Our analysis shows that two economies that have the same debt-
to-GDP ratio but face diﬀerent values for the credit multiplier and the no-commitment
delay (both determine how imperfect are international credit markets) may end up expe-
riencing very diﬀerent patterns of consumption, capital and output, and ultimately very
diﬀerent welfare levels. Last but not least, our results contrast with that of Uribe [22]
and they provide some theoretical ground to the often expressed view that economies
relying too much, in the short-run, on international financial markets may suﬀer from an
overborrowing syndrome. Our paper stresses that economies that have been growing too
slowly may not reap the benefits of financial integration but suﬀer instead from welfare
losses, in contrast with economies that have been more successful in terms of their past
growth performances.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the open AK economy model and
section 3 contains our main analytical and numerical results regarding welfare. In section
4, we show that leapfrogging and growth reversals entail large welfare gains and losses,
respectively, while section 5 investigates the condition under which financial integration
5is welfare-improving. Finally, section 6 gathers some concluding remarks.
2 The Open AK Economy Without Investment Commit-
ment
The economy produces a tradeable good Y by using physical capital K, according to
the following technology:
Y = AK, (1)
where A > 0 is total factor productivity. Whereas output is tradeable, labor and capital
are not.1 The Ramsey households are defined by their utility:
? ∞
0
e−ρt
C(t)1−σ − 1
1− σ dt, (2)
where C > 0 is consumption, σ ≥ 0 is relative risk aversion, and ρ ≥ 0 is the discount
rate. The budget constraint is:
K˙(t)− D˙(t) = AK(t)− δK(t)− rD(t)− C(t), (3)
where D is the amount of net foreign debt and the initial stocks K(0) > 0, D(0) are
given to the households.
We focus on collateral-constrained borrowing without commitment to investment and,
following Boucekkine and Pintus [5], we posit that the creditor lends up to some fraction
of the past value of collateral λK(t − τ), for some exogenous (no-commitment) delay
τ ≥ 0 and credit multiplier λ > 0.
Assumption 2.1 Foreign borrowing is subject to a limit such that D(t) = λK(t − τ),
with the credit multiplier λ > 0 and the no-commitment delay τ ≥ 0.
1Our results are virtually unchanged under capital mobility, which sets the net marginal product of
capital to the world interest rate.
6Replacing D by its expression from Assumption 2.1, the budget constraint (3) can be
written as:
K˙(t) = λK˙(t− τ) + εK(t)− rλK(t− τ)− C(t), (4)
where ε ≡ A − δ > 0. The budget constraint (4) is a non-autonomous, linear Neutral
delay Diﬀerential Equation (NDE for short), as both K and K˙ are delayed (see Bellman
and Cooke [4, chap. 6]). The simplest case of a constant savings rate is analyzed in
Boucekkine and Pintus [5]. Here we study the dynamics arising when households opti-
mally choose consumption by maximizing (2) subject to (4). Note that under autarky,
the economy does not borrow - that is, λ = 0 - and one goes back to the standard,
closed-economy AK model such that the autarkic growth rate is ga ≡ (ε − ρ)/σ, which
is assumed to be positive. The remaining part of this section is devoted to the analysis
of the dynamics and asymptotic properties when the credit multiplier λ > 0.
In a technical companion paper, Boucekkine, Fabbri and Pintus [6], we solve the opti-
mal control problem and we refer to that article for details on the dynamic programming
approach which provides a closed-form solution. In particular, we show there that: (i)
under the assumptions that ε > r and λ < 1, there exists a unique stable balanced
growth path (BGP for short) that is associated with the unique positive characteristic
root ξ, say, of z − λze−zτ − ε + rλe−zτ = 0 (see Proposition 4.1 in Boucekkine et al.
[6]), such that dξ/dλ > 0 > dξ/dτ (see Boucekkine and Pintus [5] for some comparative
statics); (ii) if ρ > (1 − σ)ξ, then there exists a unique (closed-form) solution to the
optimal control problem (see Proposition 4.3 in Boucekkine et al. [6]); (iii) consumption
jumps at t = 0 to the BGP, that is, C(t) = C0e
gt for t ≥ 0 (see Proposition 4.4 in
Boucekkine et al. [6]), where g = (ξ − ρ)/σ and:
C0 =
?
ρ− (1− σ)ξ
σ
??
KI(0)− λKI(−τ) + (ξ − ε)
? 0
−τ
e−ξsKI(s)ds
?
, (5)
where KI(t) is the initial function that is given over t ∈ [−τ, 0].
From Boucekkine et al. [6], we also infer that one gets back to the open-economy
7version of the standard AK model under investment commitment (that is, when τ = 0),
with the corresponding growth rate given by g = (ξ−ρ)/σ > ga with ξ = (ε−rλ)/(1−λ).
The above results, while technically demanding, are quite rewarding because they enable
us to study welfare in a simple way when τ > 0. In particular, the fact that, just as
in a standard AK model, consumption jumps at t = 0 to the BGP greatly simplifies
the analysis because there is no transitional dynamics of consumption (in contrast, the
capital stock that solves the NDE (4) is shown to converge asymptotically to the BGP).
Therefore, welfare changes are expected to depend on how parameters (most notably
the delay τ and the credit multiplier λ) aﬀect both the level of initial consumption C0
and the growth rate g. In other words, the welfare impact of diﬀerent parameter values
can be divided into a level eﬀect and a growth eﬀect. The next sections are devoted to
such a welfare analysis when utility is logarithmic, which we complement by numerical
examples in the CRRA case. Then we apply those results to measure the welfare eﬀects
of leapfrogging and growth reversals, which can be quite substantial.
3 No-Commitment Delay and Welfare
3.1 Some Analytics of Welfare under Logarithmic Utility and Small
Delays
The purpose of this section is to derive analytical results about welfare under loga-
rithmic utility and with delays that are arbitrarily close to zero. Recall that we denote
KI(t) the initial function defined for all t ∈ [−τ, 0]. Then using the expression of the
initial consumption level in equation (5), we now show that, for small delays, C0 is an
increasing function of the delay τ .
8Lemma 3.1 (Small Delay and the Initial Consumption Level)
Define KI(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [−τ, 0] as the initial function and μ ≡ KII(0)/KI(0). Under
the assumption that μ > μ, with μ ≡ (r− ε)/(1− λ) < 0, and that utility is logarithmic,
that is, σ = 1, then dC0/dτ > 0 at τ = 0.
That is, small no-commitment delays increase the optimal initial consumption level.
Proof: under logarithmic utility, one gets from equation (5) the expression of the optimal
initial consumption level and it is then straightforward to show that, evaluated at τ = 0,
dC0/dτ = ρKI(0)(λμ+ξ−ε) > 0, where μ ≡ KII(0)/KI(0), using that ξ = (ε−rλ)/(1−λ)
when τ = 0, and the assumption that μ > μ where μ ≡ (r − ε)/(1− λ) < 0. 2
From Lemma 3.1 follows the fact that the no-commitment delay has an ambiguous
eﬀect on welfare. This is because the delay has two opposite eﬀects on the growth rate
and on the initial level of consumption. On the one hand, there is a long-run consump-
tion growth eﬀect: increasing τ from zero reduces the growth rate g = ξ − ρ (because
it decreases the positive characteristic root ξ). In a growing economy, the higher the
delay, the more severe the debt constraint, hence the lower the growth rate. On the
other hand, there is a short-run consumption level eﬀect: a positive τ tends to increase
the initial level that is optimally chosen by the infinitely-lived household (as shown in
Lemma 3.1 under the mild requirement that the economy is not declining to fast initially,
that is, if μ > μ). This is because under the prospect of slower consumption growth, it is
optimal for households to increase their initial level of consumption so as to enjoy more
consumption in initial periods.
Therefore, when the no-commitment delay increases from zero, a larger C0 improves
welfare (there is a positive short-run, level eﬀect) whereas a lower g has the opposite
9impact (that is, a negative long-run, growth eﬀect). It perhaps helps intuition to note
that a similar trade-oﬀ arises in the standard AK model under autarky (that is, when
λ = 0) when the discount rate ρ is made to increase. It can easily be shown that, ceteris
paribus, a larger ρ translates into slower growth but a larger initial level of consumption
so that its impact on welfare is ambiguous a priori. Here also, slower growth provides
households with stronger incentives to consume more initially, so that a similar trade-oﬀ
arises and has an ambiguous eﬀect on welfare.2 In summary, both the discount rate and
the delay aﬀect the incentives to accumulate capital in the same way: both larger ρ’s
and larger τ ’s mean lower incentives to accumulate, which translate into lower g’s but
larger C0’s. In the former case, this is because households are more impatient while, in
the latter case, it is because of a tighter borrowing constraint.
We now show that the short-run eﬀect dominates the long-run eﬀect, so that wel-
fare increases when the delay goes up from zero, if and only if the initial growth rate
μ is positive and large enough. Under logarithmic utility, welfare is given by W ≡
?+∞
0 e
−ρt ln{C(t)}dt. Using C(t) = C0egt and g ≡ ξ − ρ, one gets:
W =
1
ρ
?
ln{C0}+ ξ − ρρ
?
(6)
Proposition 3.1 (Small Delay and Welfare)
Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.1, suppose that λ > λ, where λ ≡ ρ/(ρ+ ε− r) > 0.
Then there exists a threshold μ > 0 such that dW/dτ > 0 at τ = 0 if and only if
μ > μ. That is, small no-commitment delays improve welfare if and only if the economy
is initially growing fast enough.
2See also Barlevy [3] for a related discussion of level vs growth eﬀects in a diﬀerent setting.
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Proof: Using the expressions of both dC0/dτ in the proof of Lemma 3.1 and W in
equation (6), one computes that:
dW
dτ
=
1
ρ
?
λμ+ ξ − ε+ [λξ(r − ξ)]/ρ
1− λ
?
at τ = 0 so that dW/dτ and ψ ≡ λμ+ ξ − ε+ [λξ(r − ξ)]/ρ have the same sign. Using
that ξ = (ε− rλ)/(1− λ) when τ = 0, it is then easy to show that ξ + [λξ(r− ξ)]/ρ < 0
if and only if λ > λ ≡ ρ/(ρ+ ε − r). It then follows that there exists a threshold value
μ ≡ −{ξ − ε+ [λξ(r − ξ)]/ρ}/λ > 0 such that ψ > 0 if and only if μ > μ. 2
Note that λ is bound to be small if ρ takes on reasonable values so that the welfare
eﬀect that we describe happens for non-trivial levels of financial integration.
An intuitive interpretation of the result in Proposition 3.1 is as follows: the larger the
initial growth rate μ, the larger initial consumption C0 (more on this in section 4.1 about
leapfrogging). This means that large μ’s reinforce the level eﬀect. If strong enough, the
positive level eﬀect dominates the negative growth eﬀect of a lower g, when τ > 0, and
it leads to higher welfare relative to the no-delay case.
3.2 Welfare under CRRA utility: Numerical Examples
We suspect that the above results extend to σ W= 1 but the analysis then becomes
much more tedious. We now focus on the empirically appealing case σ > 1 and provide
numerical examples when τ > 0 that indeed accord with our conjecture. One important
corollary of our numerical analysis is that it allows us, in the next sections, to measure the
welfare eﬀect of leapfrogging and growth reversals. To do so, we focus on the following
benchmark parameter values:3
3The value of λ we use falls within the range of estimates provided by Djankov et al. [10].
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Assumption 3.1 The benchmark set of parameter values is : λ = 0.5, ρ = r = 0.01,
ε = 0.03 and σ = 2. In addition, the initial function is exponential, that is, KI(t) = eμt
for all t ∈ [−τ, 0], with μ real.
It follows from assumption 3.1 that when τ = 0 (no-delay case), one has that g = 2%
and C0 = 0.015, whereas under autarky (when λ = 0) the growth rate is ga = (ε−ρ)/σ =
1%. It is also easily shown that when τ > 0, the growth rate is such that 2% > g > ga.
To simplify matters, let us assume that the initial growth rate is μ = 3g. Our benchmark
case is therefore such that the economy is initially growing three times faster than the
long-run BGP growth rate. In view of Lemma 3.1, we expect that increasing the no-
commitment delay τ from zero leads to a smaller g but a larger C0. The following
table and figures show the impact of positive delays on the growth rate loss, the initial
consumption level benefit and the overall welfare gain, relative to the case without delay.
Eﬀect of delay τ on: τ = 0.1 τ = 1 τ = 10 τ = 30 τ = 70
growth rate loss = 0.01 pp 0.09 pp 0.5 pp 0.78 pp 0.94 pp
initial consumption gain = 0.7% 6% 30% 42% 41%
welfare gain = 0.3% 2.7% 7.9% 4.6% −3.2%
Table 1: Eﬀect of no-commitment delay on growth rate loss, initial consumption gain
and welfare gain, relative to no-delay case (τ = 0)
Insert Figures 1,2,3 about here
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot the levels of growth rate, initial consumption and welfare be-
hind the computations in table 1. For small delays, initial consumption goes up whereas
the growth rate goes down exponentially fast when the delay increases, and the overall
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)
Figure 1: Plot of growth rate g varying delay τ
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Figure 2: Plot of initial consumption C0 varying delay τ
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Figure 3: Plot of welfare W varying delay τ
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eﬀect is to improve welfare. Eventually though, the level eﬀect weakens and welfare goes
down for large delays, because the negative growth eﬀect then dominates.
The same picture turns out to emerge for diﬀerent parameter values. Not surprisingly,
increasing relative risk aversion σ from 2 weakens the incentives to accumulate capital
(because the household is now less willing to substitute consumption over time) so that
the level eﬀect is stronger and leads to larger welfare gains for small delays. The same
eﬀect at work: when the consumption smoothing motive becomes stronger, slower con-
sumption growth and larger initial consumption follow.
Interestingly enough, the fourth column of table 1 and figure 3 show that there exists
a welfare-maximizing delay (τopt ≈ 10).4 Compared to the no-delay case, the optimal
τopt delivers a BGP growth rate that goes down from 2% to 1.5% (from figure 1, hence a
loss of 0.5 pp in table 1) and an initial consumption level that goes up by 30% (see figure
2). Due to the large positive eﬀect of a much higher consumption level, which dominates
the negative growth eﬀect, the combined eﬀect is a non-trivial welfare increase of about
8% (see figure 3) relative to the no-delay case τ = 0.
In contrast, the last column of table 1 and figure 3 show that for τ = 70, the growth
rate drops to 1.06% and the initial consumption gain goes up to 41% (see also figure 2
and 3) so that welfare declines. Because the large growth loss now dominates the con-
sumption gain, households suﬀer a welfare loss of −3.2% compared to the no-delay case.
This welfare loss increases to 11.1% relative to the welfare maximum under τopt = 10.
Therefore, for τ ’s that are much larger than τopt, the BGP growth rate is low (and in-
deed close to that prevailing under autarky) and welfare is significantly lower than the
no-delay level. For large delays, the associated loss in the growth rate dominates the
modest consumption gain and leads to large welfare losses. We now apply our analysis
4Robustness analysis shows that this property holds for an open set of parameter values. In particular,
τopt is larger for larger σ’s and μ’s. For example, other things equal, τopt = 86 when σ = 5 and τopt = 2
when μ = 1.5g.
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to investigate the welfare consequences of leapfrogging and growth reversals.
4 Welfare Impact of Leapfrogging and Growth Reversals
4.1 The Large Welfare Gains from Leapfrogging
Following Boucekkine and Pintus [5], we define leapfrogging in consumption as the fact
that the larger the initial growth rate μ, the more consumption and the larger welfare
that is enjoyed by households. Suppose that economy A, say, had a lower initial growth
rate μ and was richer (in terms of capital and output) but growing more slowly prior
to t = 0 than economy B. In view of our assumption that growth is exponential for
t ∈ [−τ, 0], both countries end up with the same capital stock, which equals unity, at
t = 0. Then leapfrogging means that B gets to enjoy a larger consumption level C0 at
t = 0, hence a larger consumption at all dates t ≥ 0 (because consumption jumps to the
BGP at t = 0 and the growth rate g does not depend on μ). In contrast, B had lower
capital and output than A, for t ∈ [−τ, 0].
To study the welfare eﬀect of leapfrogging, we set τ = 10 so that g = 1.5% independent
of the initial growth rate μ over [−τ, 0]. Therefore, any welfare change due to variations
in μ occur because of changes in the initial consumption level. In other words, for a given
τ , only the short-run level eﬀect originates welfare changes when μ is made to vary. In
fact, it is not diﬃcult to show that, given τ not too large, the level eﬀect is positive
on welfare, that is, dC0/dμ > 0 under CRRA utility. In particular, welfare gains are
generated by leapfrogging for τ = 10, as illustrated by table 2 below.
14
Eﬀect of initial growth rate μ on: μ = −g μ = 0 μ = g μ = 3g
initial consumption gain = 48% 66% 82% 107%
Table 2: Consumption gain of leapfrogging relative to initial growth rate μ = −3g
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here
Figure 4 plots C0 as a function of μ and λ. It shows that given λ, the initial consump-
tion level increases with the initial growth rate. in other words, leapfrogging occurs:
the faster growth in the initial time interval, the higher consumption. For the chosen
parameter values (see assumption 3.1), there is always leapfrogging for reasonable μ’s,
which turns out to be also true for larger values of τ ’s.5 Note that relative risk aversion
σ has no impact on the relative consumption gains because it aﬀects only the scaling
factor of C0 (see equation (5)).
Table 2 shows that consumption gains due to leapfrogging can be very large. For
example, suppose that economy A has been declining at μ = −3g = −4.5%, implying
(in annualized data) that it takes 16 years to halve consumption. In contrast, economy
B has been enjoying fast growth at μ = 3g = 4.5% so that its consumption is expected
to double in 16 years. Then B enjoys an initial consumption that is about twice as large
as that of A (implying that its welfare is about 50% larger). Sensitivity analysis shows
that leapfrogging still generates large consumption gains for large delays, for reasonable
values of μ. It is also worth noting that the larger λ, the bigger welfare gains due to
leapfrogging, as one can see in figure 4. One also notes from figure 4 that, given λ larger
than 0.5, C0 is a concave function of μ, which indicates that the welfare gains from
leapfrogging are asymmetric: they are much more important for countries that have ini-
tially been either declining or growing very slowly. In other words, an increase of 1 pp in
5This is in contrast with what happens in the Solow case studied by Boucekkine and Pintus [5].
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the initial growth rate generates larger welfare gains from leapfrogging when μ is small
or negative.
Finally, a striking feature in figure 4 is that the eﬀect of the credit multiplier λ on
initial consumption C0 is positive when μ is positive and large enough but reverses for
negative μ’s. This suggests that, for a given delay, financial globalization may decrease
welfare if the economy is initially growing too slowly. We come back to this point in
section 5, after we show how growth reversals entail large welfare losses.
4.2 The Large Welfare Losses from Growth Reversals
We now study the implications of our results for welfare when growth reversals occur.
As in Boucekkine and Pintus [5], we define a growth reversal as a sudden break in the
growth rate, when the latter goes either from below to above trend or from above to below
trend. The next proposition shows that the condition for growth reversals is identical
to that derived in Boucekkine and Pintus [5] for the Solow case (the proof is similar
and therefore omitted). To derive such a condition, it is more convenient to study the
detrended NDE arising when we perform the change of variable x(t) = e−gtK(t).
Proposition 4.1 (Growth Reversals for Large Delays)
Suppose that the initial function of the detrended NDE associated to (4) is xI(t) = e
φt
for t ∈ [−τ, 0] and some φ real. It follows that φx˙(0) < 0, hence convergence to the BGP
is non-monotonic, if and only if:
gτ > r +
φ
eφτ − 1 , (7)
If φ ≈ 0, then condition (7) writes as:
τ(gτ − r) > 1. (8)
16
Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here
Note that the initial growth rate of detrended capital x relates to that of capital K
through φ = μ− g. Condition (8) can be viewed in a simple way as the fact that growth
reversals occur only if the no-commitment delay is large enough (see Boucekkine and
Pintus [5] for an intuitive discussion of why this is the case). We now provide examples
that illustrate Proposition 4.1. Figures 6 and 7 (based on table 1 and figures 1-3) picture
the short-run dynamics6 of detrended capital x for two economies that are similar in
all respect except that τ = 10 for economy A and τ = 70 for economy B. Economy A
goes through negligible growth breaks (figure 6) whereas economy B experiences sharp
growth reversals (figure 7). Because figure 7 plots log[x(t)] = log[e−gtK(t)], the kinks
that appear at dates that are multiples of τ = 70 indicate growth reversals. For example,
figure 7 assumes that the economy grows above the BGP level at μ = 3g so that the
detrended growth rate φ = 2g is positive prior to t = 0. Right after t = 0, however,
detrended capital declines, which indicates that the growth rate of K is below the BGP
level g until t ≈ 25, when the detrended growth rate becomes positive again. At t = 70,
a second growth reversal occurs and it leads to growth below trend until t ≈ 125.
From table 1, we know that A’s welfare is about 11% higher than B’s even though
B’s initial consumption is about 9% larger than A’s. The higher welfare in A comes
from the larger BGP growth rate (1.5% vs 1.06% for B; see table 1). Such a diﬀerence
in annualized growth rates means that while it takes 46 years to double consumption
in A, it takes 66 years in B, that is, about one more generation. In addition, figures 6
and 7 tell us that A’s long-run output is about 5% higher than B’s. Therefore, growth
reversals are associated with welfare losses because they require large no-commitment
delays (that is, τ ’s that are much larger than τopt).
6Figures 6 and 7 are produced using the Matlab NDE solver provided by Shampine [21].
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Figure 6: Plot of log of detrended capital against time when τ=10
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Figure 7: Plot of log of detrended capital against time when τ=70
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It it worth stressing that welfare losses under growth reversals are not due to con-
sumption volatility (as consumption jumps to the BGP at t = 0) but rather because the
negative growth eﬀects dominates the positive level eﬀect on consumption. Not surpris-
ingly, higher σ’s lead to smoother growth reversals, as expected because intertemporal
substitution is then less strong. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the dynamics
of detrended capital depicted in figures 6-7 is also that of the real exchange rate, defined
as the price of non-tradeable good (labor, which is inelastic and normalized to one) in
terms of the tradeable good (output), as the latter is proportional to capital in an AK
economy. This implies that growth reversals in capital are also associated with growth
reversals in the real exchange rate.
5 Is Financial Integration Welfare-improving without In-
vestment Commitment?
A widely used measure of financial integration is the debt-to-GDP ratio. Absent delay
(that is, with investment commitment), D/Y = λ/A is a measure of how the economy
relies on international borrowing and it depends on the credit multiplier λ, which is
the only parameter related to credit market imperfections. With no-commitment delay,
however, D(t)/Y (t) = λK(t − τ)/(AK(t)) so that the extent of financial globalization
depends on both the credit multiplier λ and the delay τ , which both relate to how
financial markets are imperfect, and also on the short-run dynamics of K. Note that
along the BGP, D/Y = λ/(Aegτ ), with gτ typically increasing with τ so the eﬀect of
τ counteracts the eﬀect of λ. This implies that D/Y may be a poor indicator of how
financial integration aﬀects growth and welfare because two economies with the same
D/Y but diﬀerent τ ’s and λ’s may experience very diﬀerent patterns of consumption,
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capital and output. To illustrate this point, this section takes two steps. We first study,
for a given τ , the impact of λ on growth and welfare. Next we give an example of two
economies that have a similar debt-to-GDP ratio but experience diﬀerent time paths,
welfare and long-run levels because they have diﬀerent τ ’s and λ’s.
We first give examples showing that high λ’s may lead to welfare losses under the
no-commitment delay. Such a conclusion can already be drawn from figures 4 and 5.
Figures 4 and 5 reveal that increasing λ is not welfare improving for economies that
are growing slowly, when τ is positive. In contrast, when τ = 0, then dC0/dλ > 0 and
dg/dλ > 0 so that dW/dλ > 0, as we now show.7 The proof is omitted because it follows
from straightforward computations.
Proposition 5.1 (Financial Integration and Welfare under Small Delay)
Under the assumptions of Lemma 3.1, dW/dλ > 0 at τ = 0 if and only if ε > r + ρ.
That is, foreign borrowing improves welfare under small no-commitment delays provided
that the economy is productive enough.
Proposition 5.1 states that under logarithmic utility and a mild condition ensuring
that the economy can aﬀord borrowing, welfare goes up with λ when τ = 0. In essence,
this is because both the level eﬀect and the growth eﬀect of consumption on welfare
are then positive. Without delay and under logarithmic utility, we get the rosy view of
financial globalization: it boosts growth and welfare.
In sharp contrast, for delays that are positive but moderate, both eﬀects may go
in opposite direction when μ is too small because a larger λ reduces C0 (see figures 4
and 5 when τ = 10). When the no-commitment delay is positive and moderate, financial
integration may hamper welfare although it boosts growth. To illustrate this, we go back
7The comparative statics of the growth rate are studied in Boucekkine and Pintus [5].
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to last section’s parameter values, setting in particular τ = 10. To make the contrast
more dramatic, we compare the eﬀects of μ = −g and μ = 3g. The following table 3
shows that the welfare impact of financial integration reverses for declining economies.
Welfare change: λ = 0.1 λ = 0.5 λ = 1
μ = 3g 2% 18% 51%
μ = −g −2% −15% −155%
Table 3: Welfare gain and losses from financial integration relative to autarky (λ = 0)
Robustness analysis indicates that the same results hold for larger τ ’s. The intuitive
explanation for this outcome can again be grasped by comparing the level and growth
eﬀects. Because of intertemporal consumption substitution, if μ >> g, then growth
should slow down to g in the long-run so that large increases of initial consumption and
welfare follow (see figures 4 and 5). On the contrary, if μ << g is small or negative,
there is faster consumption growth in the long-run relative to the initial time interval so
that initial consumption and welfare fall.
The large welfare losses reported in the last row of table 3 add some skepticism to the
rosy view that financial globalization helps stagnating or declining countries to boost
both growth and welfare. This is because increasing λ improves g in such a way that
the growth eﬀect is strong and adds up to the positive level eﬀect only when μ is large.8
The overall welfare increase when μ = 3g is large (51% in the last column of table 3
when λ = 1), because the growth rate increases by 1.32 pp from 1% (that is, it more
than doubles) and C0 is larger. In contrast, when μ < g, the negative eﬀect dominates
8To be more precise, the level eﬀect is negative and small when λ ≈ 0 but becomes positive and large
when λ is close to one. In the last column of table 3, the initial consumption increase is about 25%,
which adds to the positive growth eﬀect.
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because the same increase in g now faces a 76% decline in the initial consumption level.
Some interesting policy implications follow from the above examples. In a world with
imperfect financial markets, financial globalization is good for growth and it also im-
proves welfare only for fast-growing countries. In contrast, it may be detrimental to
welfare in slowly-growing or declining countries. Because the model is overly simple, it
implies that the welfare-maximizing value of λ is either 0 or 1, depending on the initial
growth rate. In other words, the model predicts that the economy may be subject to the
overborrowing syndrome (in contrast with results in Uribe [22]). This is because for a
given no-commitment delay, more borrowing (higher λ’s) is worse for welfare than less
(lower λ’s) when μ is too small, which leads to excessive borrowing from a welfare point
of view.
In addition, in our model economy reducing market frictions may take two forms with
quite diﬀerent implications. First, increasing λ unambiguously leads to a larger welfare
provided that initial growth is suﬃcient, as shown above. Increasing the collateral rate
relaxes borrowing constraints and is good for welfare because additional financing en-
hances growth (in line with the evidence on domestic finance documented in, e.g., King
and Levine [14, 15] and Rajan and Zingales [19]), even though it may amplify growth
reversals and cause episodes of growth deceleration (as indicated in the dataset studied
by Rancie`re et alii [20]). A diﬀerent conclusion arises if reducing market imperfections
means reducing the delay τ . Our results above indicate that this is bad for welfare if the
economy is growing fast initially and if the delay is such that τopt ≥ τ . This is because
although such an institutional change boosts growth, it reduces initial consumption too
much. In contrast, it is welfare-improving to reduce market imperfections when they are
quite severe, that is, when the no-commitment delay is very large.
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Insert Figures 8,9,10 about here
We end this section by an example suggesting that D/Y may not be a good indicator
of how financial integration aﬀects growth and welfare. Suppose we compare economies
A and B that are similar (in particular μ = 3g for both), except that A has λ = 0.5
and τ = 10 whereas B has λ = 0.94 and τ = 70. Both economies have, in the long-run,
the same debt-to-GDP ratio which is about 43% (and falls within the range of estimates
provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti [16]).9 The time path of A appears in figure 6
and figure 8 plots that of B, which indicates that whereas the former economy has a
quick and monotonic transition towards it detrended long-run level of capital, the latter
goes through sharp growth reversals10 (note that B enjoys a slightly larger detrended
capital stock than A in the long-run). Moreover, both economies have debt-to-GDP
ratios that exhibit very diﬀerent patterns over time. Figure 9 and 10 plot the debt-to-
GDP ratios of A and B, respectively, against time. In figures 9 and 10, A enters the
period with a large leverage ratio (that is, about 32%), whereas B starts at t = 0 with
less than 10% (because it faces a larger delay). In addition, whereas the debt-to-GDP
ratio of A significantly accelerates after t = 0 (figure 9), B has to patiently build up debt
and its leverage ratio goes through growth reversals before reaching the same long-run
level as that of A (see figure 10). In other words, despite having eventually the same
level of financial integration, both economies have diﬀerent transitional dynamics. Not
surprisingly, A and B also have diﬀerent growth rates, initial consumption and welfare
levels. While B enjoys at t = 0 a 14% consumption gain over A, its consumption grows
9We now assume A = 1, which leads to an unrealistically high value for the depreciation rate δ given
that ε = A−δ = 0.03 according to assumption 3.1. To avoid this problem, we could alternatively suppose
that D(t) = λY (t − τ), which would leave our analysis unaﬀected, save for the fact that ε = 1 − δ/A.
Under such an assumption, the scaling factor A would not aﬀect the D/Y ratio.
10Compared to figure 7, figure 8 pictures growth reversals that are more pronounced because λ = 0.94
(instead of λ = 0.5 in figure 7) so that the economy relies more heavily on external borrowing.
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Figure 8: Plot of log of detrended capital against time when λ=0.94 and τ=70
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Figure 9: Plot of ratio D(t)/Y(t) against time when λ=0.5 and τ=10
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more slowly (g ≈ 1.5% for A while g ≈ 1.1% for B) so that B ends up having a lower
welfare at t = 0. Note that this picture is consistent with the fact that more leverage
improves both growth and welfare when μ is large enough: because A enjoys a larger
debt-to-GDP ratio from t = 0 onward, it grows more quickly and achieves higher welfare
than B at t = 0. Even in the long-run, when both economies have similar D/Y ’s, A
and B may have diﬀerent welfare levels. For example, when t = 200; although A and B
have almost reached their common long-run level of debt-to-GDP, the former economy’s
consumption is about two times larger than the latter’s. This is because A’s growth rate
is significantly larger than B’s, which leads to a welfare level that is larger in A relative
to B.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that leapfrogging and growth reversals have sizeable
eﬀects on welfare, in an open AK economy subject to both a collateral constraint and the
inability to commit to an investment level. In particular, the result that sudden reversals
in the growth rate may have large adverse eﬀects on consumption well-being accords with
intuition. Moreover, our analysis provides still another framework such that, in sharp
contrast with the standard AK setting, maximizing growth is not always equivalent to
maximizing welfare: this is the case in our model under small no-commitment delays.
Our analysis shows that economies that have historically been growing fast are the most
likely to reap the benefits from financial integration. More surprisingly, one of our
conclusions is that reducing the level of credit market frictions (that is, decreasing the
level of the no-commitment delay or increasing the credit multiplier) is not always welfare-
improving. Last but not least, our conclusions related to financial integration emphasize
that economies relying heavily on international credit markets may indeed suﬀer from
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overborrowing, in the sense that a too high debt-to-GDP ratio may be detrimental to
welfare. More generally, our analysis of borrowing without investment commitment
indicates that both the credit multiplier, that is much stressed by the current literature,
and the no-commitment delay, that is a key dimension of this paper’s analysis, are
important parameters determining how financial integration aﬀects growth and welfare.
Several potential extensions of our analysis appear natural. On the theoretical side, it
seems worthwhile to dig deeper into the mechanisms behind growth. In that respect, our
results can be build upon to introduce Schumpeterian growth and channels through which
external finance aﬀects innovation. On the empirical side, it is an open question whether
the no-commitment assumption could explain the patterns of credit flows towards both
developed and developing countries and their eﬀects on growth performances. We believe
this calls for further research.
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